Dancing around Employment at-Will: Can Fraud Provide Plaintiffs a Way to Hold Their Employers Liable by Meadows, James E.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 65 
Issue 4 Fall 2000 Article 5 
Fall 2000 
Dancing around Employment at-Will: Can Fraud Provide Plaintiffs 
a Way to Hold Their Employers Liable 
James E. Meadows 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James E. Meadows, Dancing around Employment at-Will: Can Fraud Provide Plaintiffs a Way to Hold Their 
Employers Liable, 65 MO. L. REV. (2000) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Dancing Around Employment At-Will:
Can Fraud Provide Plaintiffs a Way to Hold
Their Employers Liable?
O 'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the employment at-will doctrine has formed an
important part of American jurisprudence. The doctrine, and what some see as
its potentially harsh results, have received strong criticism. In some states,
courts have used their ability to modify the common law to alter the employment
at-will doctrine by creating exceptions based on public policy, the use of
employee handbooks, and face-to-face statements by managers that imply a
promise of employment.3 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
of Missouri recently gave discharged employees a new way to avoid the almost
absolute bar of the employment at-will doctrine.4 Based on the court's decision
in O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., plaintiffs may now be able to dance around
the barrier of the employment at-will doctrine if they are able to demonstrate
fraud. However, this decision, which provides plaintiffs with a new weapon in
wrongful termination suits, may be in conflict with previous Missouri law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Charles O'Neal and Stifel, Nicolaus, & Company ("Stifel"), a securities
brokerage firm, were involved in negotiations about the possibility of O'Neal
coming to work for Stifel.5 Stifel proposed that O'Neal leave his current
employment to become the branch manager and assistant vice-president of one
1. 996 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
2. See Ross P. Andrews & Richard A. Moroko, Employment-at-Will in New York
Remains Essentially Unchanged After a Century ofRefinements, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept.-Oct.
1999, at 8.
3. See generally Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that statements made by company president that "if you are loyal to [See's
Candies] and do a good job, your future is secure" could give rise to an action based on
contract); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(recognizing an exception to the employment at-will doctrine based on public policy
when employee is terminated for reporting a violation of law or government regulations);
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (holding that express
statements in employee handbooks could take the employment relationship outside the
bounds of the employment at-will doctrine).
4. O'Neal, 996 S.W.2d at 703.
5. Id. at 701.
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of Stifel's brokerage offices.6 According to O'Neal, one of Stifel's employees,
Michael Murphy, told him that Stifel was going to employ him.7 The brokerage
firm also sent O'Neal a letter offering him specific terms of employment.8 The
letter did not, however, give O'Neal a definite amount of time for which he
would be employed and it did not limit the reasons that Stifel could discharge
him.9 O'Neal responded by sending Stifel a letter clarifying the terms of their
agreement and even adding some new terms.
In preparation for employment with Stifel, O'Neal recruited a sales aid to
assist him and began the process of ending his previous employment." O'Neal
even informed his clients of his new position and began the process of
transferring his existing client base over to Stifel.' 2 One week before O'Neal
was to begin his new job, Stifel informed him that it would be unable to employ
him under the terms of their previous agreement. 3
O'Neal filed suit in St. Louis City Circuit Court, alleging two separate
counts, both growing out of Stifel's failure to employ him. 4 First, O'Neal
sought damages for breach of contract. 5 Specifically, O'Neal claimed that
Stifel's failure to employ him under the terms of their earlier agreement
constituted a breach of that agreement. 6 Count II of the petition alleged that
Stifel had committed two different types of fraud against O'Neal.'7 First, O'Neal
claimed that Stifel had fraudulently induced him to accept a position as a branch
manager and an assistant vice-president with the company. 8 In making his
claim, O'Neal alleged that Stifel caused Murphy to make material
misrepresentations about Stifel's employment offer and that both the company
and Murphy knew that Murphy's representations were false. 9 O'Neal claimed
that Stifel intended for him to rely, to his detriment, on Murphy's
6. Id.
7. Id. at 703.




12. Id. at 701,703.
13. Id. at 701.
14. Id. at 700-01.
15. Id. at 701. O'Neal's breach of contract claim received little comment in the
court's opinion because O'Neal did not appeal the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against him on count I. Id.
16. Id. The court seems to imply that there was an agreement between the parties
about some of the terms of O'Neal's employment. Because count I was not before the
court on appeal, it never expressly addressed whether the letters between Stifel and
O'Neal constituted a contract.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 703.
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representations." Second, O'Neal claimed that Stifel falsely represented the
terms of his proposed employment, "upon which he detrimentally relied, causing
him to engage in a series of actions to terminate his then present employment;
to commence the transfer of his existing client base; and to hire a support staff
to assist him at his new position with Stifel."'
Stifel filed a motion for summary judgment against both of O'Neal's
claims.' Stifel claimed that count I of O'Neal's claim was barred as a matter of
law by the employment at-will doctrine and that count II failed because it was
a claim for fraud that arose out of a contract claim.? Because the contract claim
was precluded by the employment at-will doctrine,4 Stifel argued that the fraud
claim was similarly precluded by the doctrine.' The trial judge granted Stifel's
summary judgment motion as to count 1.26 As to count II, however, the trial
court concluded that Stifel had failed to include any references to undisputed
facts as required by the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure.27 The judge, on his
own motion, turned Stifel's summary judgment motion into a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.28 The trial judge reviewed count II and dismissed it
because "the alleged misrepresentations [were] the same statements which
form[ed] the basis of O'Neal's breach of contract claim."29
O'Neal appealed the trial court's ruling on count II of his petition to the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri.30 The court
20. Id.
21. Id. at 701.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The employment at-will doctrine:
[C]reates a presumption that, absent an agreement establishing a fixed
duration, an employee is retained at-will. If the employee is unable to rebut
that presumption by reference to a contractual limitation (such as a collective
bargaining agreement) or statutory restriction (such as equal employment
opportunity laws), he or she may be terminated 'at any time for any reason or
even for no reason.'
Andrews & Moroko, supra note 2, at 8. Thus, an at-will employee cannot maintain an
action for breach of contract based solely on her termination. Unless the employment
agreement specifically states otherwise, at-will employees can be fired at anytime after
they have accepted ajob. Andrews & Moroko, supra note 2, at 8. Because O'Neal was
unable to demonstrate that his employment relationship with Stifel was anything other
than employment at-will, he could not sue Stifel under contract law for terminating him
because Stifel had an unqualified right to do so. Cf O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,
996 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).





30. Id. at 702.
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overturned the trial judge's ruling and remanded the case for further
proceedings." In reaching its decision, the court held that O'Neal's fraud claims
arose out of the negotiations behind the contract, not the contract itself, and
therefore were not barred by the employment at-will doctrine.32
Ii. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Employment is one of the most fundamental aspects of any American's life.
For many, a job is more than just a source of income-it is a way of life, and for
many, their sole source of financial security.33 Over the past forty years,
Americans have become increasingly dependent on working to provide their
entire livelihood.' The ability to provide food, shelter, education, medical care,
and retirement income are all deeply intertwined with employment in the labor
market.3 Because of the basic importance to an individual's welfare in keeping
a job, numerous industrialized nations have adopted laws protecting employment
security.36 Western European nations such as France, Germany, and Great
Britain all have laws preventing "unjust" employee terminations.37
The United States follows a different path. In almost every American
jurisdiction, the employment at-will doctrine is the basic foundation on which
the entire corpus of employment law is built.38 Missouri is no exception to the
rule.39 The employment at-will doctrine states that "when an employee is hired
for an indefinite period of time, the employee or the employer may terminate the
relationship without cause at any time."'  In Missouri, absent a contrary
31. Id. at 704. Chief Judge Dowd wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel. The
panel also included Judge Karohl and Senior Judge Blackmar, a former Missouri
Supreme Court Judge.
32. Id. at 702-03.
33. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the
Modern At WillRule, 51 UMKC L. REv. 189, 196 (1983).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine:
Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REV. 855, 862 (1983).
37. Id.
38. Id. Only South Dakota does not adhere to the employment at-will doctrine.
Id. The employment relationship in South Dakota is governed by state statute: "[A]
'servant is presumed to be hired for such length of time as the parties adopt for the
estimation of wages. A hiring at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year."' Id.
(quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-1-3 (Michie 1978)). "The employer has the burden
of proving grounds for termination, such as habitual neglect or willful breach of duty, or
continued incapacity." Id. (citing Goodwyn v. Sencore, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 824, 829
(D.S.D. 1975)).
39. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985) (upholding the continuing
validity of the employment at-will doctrine in Missouri).
40. Heinsz, supra note 36, at 855-56.
1006 [Vol. 65
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statutory provision or one of a limited number of exceptions, the doctrine
prevents discharged employees from suing their former employers for wrongful
termination, breach of contract, prima facie tort, or any other claim arising from
the existence of an employment agreement.4' The doctrine also prevents a cause
of action for breach of a promise to hire someone as an at-will employee. 2
The employment at-will doctrine is a relatively new phenomenon in
American jurisprudence.43 The doctrine arose in the middle of the nineteenth
century, just before the dawn of the Industrial Revolution." Prior to that time,
most American jurisdictions followed the classic English rule "that unless
expressed to the contrary, a term of employment was presumed to be for one
year." However, a few states followed the rule that the period of payment
determined the duration of employment."
Scholars trace the beginning of the dominance of the employment at-will
doctrine to Horace Wood's 1877 treatise on master-servant law.4' Wood's
treatise included a short statement that a hiring for an indefinite term is a hiring
at-will and placed the burden of proving otherwise on the discharged servant. 
4
41. See Dake, S.W.2d at 192-93 (indicating discharged employees cannot maintain
either an action for wrongful discharge or prima facie tort).
42. See Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications, 761 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
43. See Heinsz, supra note 36, at 858.
44. See Heinsz, supra note 36, at 859.
45. Heinsz, supra note 36, at 859. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when
the rule originally developed, labor was a scarce commodity and a master could not
dismiss a servant without "reasonable cause." Heinsz, supra note 36, at 859.
46. See Heinsz, supra note 36, at 859. At least Arkansas and South Carolina
followed the rule that the period of payment determined the duration of employment. See
Heinsz, supra note 36, at 859. The Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted this rule
in Pinckney v. Talmage, 10 S.E. 1083, 1084 (S.C. 1890). In Pinckney, a clerk sued his
ex-employer for breach of contract, alleging that he was due salary for the entire year
even though he had been fired only one month into the year. Id. Because the clerk was
paid monthly, the court held that his employment contract, which lacked a stated
duration, only ran for a month at a time. Id. Arkansas used a similar rule until well into
the twentieth century. See Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 194 S.W. 25, 26 (Ark. 1917).
The Arkansas Supreme Court succinctly explained its approach in the following way:
[W]here a unit of time is described in mentioning the compensation without
any other reference to time, it is fairly inferable that the parties intended to
contract for that period of time. Of course, the terms thus specified are to
some extent indefinite, and may be controlled by the circumstances of any
particular case, but in the absence of countervailing circumstances we think
that a trial court orjury is warranted in construing the terms of the contract to
be for a hiring for the unit of time specified in fixing the wages or salary.
Id.
47. See Krauskopf, supra note 33, at 192; see also HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1886).
48. See WOOD, supra note 47, § 136, at 283. Wood's rationale has undergone
2000] 1007
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After its publication, the employment at-will doctrine spread quickly and soon
became the law in a majority of states. 9 One possible reason for the doctrine's
rapid acceptance was the social and business environment in America during the
late nineteenth century. 0 Professor Krauskopf explains:
The application of the at will doctrine did not seem harsh for a
variety of reasons. An individual's employment relationship with any
one employer was seldom of long term economic significance. The
cultural frontier mentality and the burgeoning variety of commercial
some significant criticism. More recent examinations argue that the six cases Wood
relied on to support his statement do not back up his proposition. Professor Krauskopf
explains:
Wood cited four American cases and two Scottish cases in support of his rule.
•.. Wood's allocation of the burden of proof of a term (of employment) is
consistent with two of the decisions holding that the jury was properly
permitted to determine whether a term was agreed upon from the evidence of
all the circumstances surrounding the contract. Wood's second sentence,
however, that proof of wage rate for a period does not establish the term, is
not supported by any of the six cases. Most significantly, not one of the cases
supports the proposition that an indefinite hiring may be ended at will, in the
sense of without justification. Wood's reference to proof of a term in the
same sentence that he used the expression at will indicates that, by using at
will, he meant only without a durational term.
Krauskopf, supra note 33, at 192 (citations omitted).
49. See Heinsz, supra note 36, at 859. Today, only South Dakota marches to the
beat of a different drummer. Id. South Dakota's statutes provide that "[t]he length of
time which an employer and employee adopt for the estimation of wages is relevant to
a determination of the term of employment." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-1-3 (Michie
1998). While South Dakota's approach is different in theory from other states, whether
any practical differences exist is open to debate. On its face, South Dakota's statute
appears to make the employee's pay period determinative of the duration of her
employment contract unless some other duration for the agreement is stated. In Goodwyn
v. Sencore, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D.S.D. 1975), a federal district court with
diversity jurisdiction over the parties interpreted the statute in exactly that manner. The
Goodwyn court held that an employee who was hired at a yearly rate of $15,000 had an
employment contract that was intended by the parties to last one year. Id. The employee
was awarded the unpaid balance of his yearly salary by the court. Id. at 830. South
Dakota's own supreme court has not, however, ever interpreted the statute in this manner.
It has only been faced with the implications of Section 60-1-3 on two occasions. See
Blote v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 422 N.W.2d 834 (S.D. 1988); Ruple v. Weinaug,
328 N.W.2d 857 (S.D. 1983). In both Blote and Ruple, the court generally acknowledged
the presumption created by Section 60-1-3 and simultaneously recognized an exception
to it. In Blote, an explicit statement in the Savings and Loan Association's by-laws made
the employee an employee at-will; and in Ruple, a state statute authorizing a municipality
to fire its finance officer at any time also overcame the presumption and created an at-will
relationship. Blote, 422 N.W.2d at 837; Ruple, 328 N.W.2d at 858-59.
50. See Krauskopf, supra note 33, at 191; Heinsz, supra note 36, at 861-62.
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enterprises led to an expectation of personal mobility and
entrepreneurial instability. . . .Most important . . . long-term
economic security in the sense of provision for subsistence, food,
shelter, medical care, disability protection and retirement or old-age
'insurance' was self-insured by the family institution, the basic
personal protection unit of society.5
One of the first states to adopt the employment at-will doctrine was New
York. In 1895, the New York Court of Appeals handed down Martin v. New
York Life Insurance Co. 2 In Martin, the court "embraced the 'inflexible' rule
that a 'general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will."' 53 Missouri's
employment at-will doctrine is very similar to the one enunciated by the court
in Martin with a few "modem" exceptions. According to the Missouri Supreme
Court, employees who do not have a contract for a definite period of time are
considered employees at-will. 4 An at-will employee can generally be
discharged by an employer without fear of liability for wrongful discharge at any
time, for any reason, or no reason at all.55
Missouri also embraced the employment at-will doctrine shortly after
Wood's treatise was published. In 1883, in Finger v. Koch & Schilling Brewing
Co.,56 the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated that "[a]n indefinite hiring, at so
much per day, per month, or per year, is a hiring at will, and may be terminated
by either party at any time."' The court denied recovery of five hundred dollars
to a brewer who had been terminated in the middle of the year. The court held
that the brewer could be discharged by his employer at any time because the
employee's only evidence concerning the duration of his employment agreement
was that the employer had agreed to let him work for the full year "[i]f you do
your work well."5 9 In announcing the employment at-will doctrine, the court did
51. Krauskopf, supra note 33, at 191.
52. 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895); see Andrews & Moroko, supra note 2, at 8.
53. Id. at417.
54. See Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. 1981).
55. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985). There are, of course,
some clearly recognized exceptions to this doctrine. Missouri courts have recognized a
"public policy" exception to the employment at-will doctrine. See Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). While it does not alter the fact
that discharged employees cannot sue under a breach of contract theory, the exception
allows discharged employees to bring an action for tort damages. Although the Missouri
Supreme Court has yet to deal with this issue, the public policy exception was first
recognized almost two decades ago by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District of Missouri in Boyle.
56. 13 Mo. App. 310 (1883).
57. Id. at311.
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not rely on previous Missouri precedent or Wood's treatise.' Instead, the court
relied on an opinion from the California Supreme Court, which had earlier
embraced the employment at-will doctrine.6 '
Unlike some states, Missouri did not elect to use the employment at-will
doctrine as a replacement for an earlier approach. Only two other Missouri cases
prior to 1890 raise the same issues addressed in Finger. In 1880, in Boogher v.
Maryland Life Insurance Co.,62 the St. Louis Court of Appeals rejected the
English rule that a hiring for an indefinite period implies a hiring for a year-long
term.63 And then in 1887, in Evan v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern
Railway Co.," the St. Louis Court of Appeals again wrestled with presumed
duration of employment contracts. In Evan, the court relied on its decision in
Finger and stated that using a monthly pay period did not take the parties to the
agreement outside the bounds of the employment at-will doctrine.65 Prior to
1880, Missouri courts apparently never faced the issue of the duration of an
employment agreement when a specific time period was not stated. The state's
approach to employment agreements was to treat them like ordinary contracts.
Missouri's first and probably only "real" employment law case prior to the Civil
War demonstrates that its courts primarily analyzed the employment relationship
using general contract law principles.' In 1841, the court, for example, held that
one party's breach could be excused if she was prevented from performing by
the other party's actions.67
60. Id. at 311-13.
61. Id. at 311. Even though the court did not specifically embrace Wood's treatise,
they were aware of it. The brewing company's lawyer, in his arguments to the court
directly cited to Wood's treatise for the exact same proposition the court announced in
its opinion using a California Supreme Court case as support. Id. The attorney also cited
to Posey v. Garth, 7 Mo. 94 (1841), what appears to be the first exclusive "employment
law" case ever decided in Missouri. Id. For a discussion of Posey, see infra note 66.
62. 8 Mo. App. 533 (1880).
63. Id. at 534. The court rejected the English rule because of "its origin in local
customs" and its harsh "consequences which have made even English judges hesitate to
enforce it." Id. What exactly the harsh consequences of the rule were and why they had
to be especially heinous for even English judges to refuse to enforce it were left unstated
by the court. Id.
64. 24 Mo. App. 114 (1887).
65. Id. at 117-18.
66. See Posey, 7 Mo. at 94. Posey is a rather disturbing case to have as Missouri's
first employment law precedent. In Posey, a planter hired someone to work as his
overseer for one year. Id. at 95. Just a few months into the contract, the overseer was
fired for beating a slave to death with a whip and a handspike. Id. at 95-96. The overseer
then sued, claiming he was fired without any just cause. Id. at 96. The Missouri
Supreme Court held that the slave's "mere disobedience of orders" was not sufficient
justification for the overseer's actions and held that the planter had both the right and




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/5
EMPLOYMENT AT- WILL
The employment at-will doctrine does more than simply prevent a
discharged employee from maintaining a suit predicated on wrongful termination
or breach of contract. Missouri law also prevents discharged employees from
successfully making any kind of tort claim out of their termination if the claim
relies on the same facts that could be used for a breach of contract or wrongful
discharge action but for the employment at-will doctrine. The Missouri Supreme
Court first directly confronted this issue in Dake v. Tuell. 8
In Dake, the court held that the plaintiffs could not "cloak their claims in the
misty shroud of prima facie tort" to avoid the prohibitions of the employment at-
will doctrine."9 The court noted that the employment at-will doctrine is firmly
°rooted in Missouri case law and prohibits actions for wrongful discharge against
a former employer absent a contract for a definite period or some specific
statutory provision.70 Allowing a plaintiff to maintain an action in prima facie
tort using the same facts that would fail to give rise to a wrongful discharge
claim would, according to the court, "render near impotent" the employment at-
will doctrine.7' The only way a discharged employee can hope to recover, absent
a statutory provision on which to base her claim, is to set forth "the essential
elements of a valid contract, and a discharge in violation thereof."
72
The Dake opinion, by its very terms, can be read as establishing "that there
may be no action for wrongful termination in the absence of contract or statute"
no matter what type of claim, including any tort claims, a party attempts to
assert.73 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri
interpreted the Dake opinion and its progeny in this narrow manner. In
Hanrahan v. Nashua Corp.,74 the Eastern District faced a very similar situation
68. 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985).
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 192-93.
71. Id. at 193.
72. Id. (quoting Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406,409 (Mo.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 929 (1965)).
73. Id. at 194 (Blackmar, J., concurring). This concern led Judge Blackmar to be
the only concurrence to the court's opinion. Id. Judge Blackmar read the majority's
opinion as going too far and foreclosing the possibility of future growth in the law. Id.
He was concerned that the decision would foreclose the court from considering other tort
claims that might arise out of an employment termination. Id. As an example, Judge
Blackmar pointed to Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984), a case
decided by the Eighth Circuit applying Arkansas law. In Lucas, the employee alleged
that she had been discharged because she had refused to sleep with her foreman. Id. at
1202. Judge Blackmar disagreed with the majority's holding in Dake to the extent that
it would exclude such claims as the one presented in Lucas. See Dake, 687 S.W.2d at
193 (Blackmar, J., concurring). Serving as a Special Judge in the O'Neal case, Judge
Blackmar was able to avoid a broad reading of the Dake holding and allow discharged
employees to sue under the tort claim of fraud. See generally O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus
& Co., 996 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
74. 752 S.W.2d 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
2000] 1011
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to the one it faced eleven years later in O'Neal. The plaintiff in Hanrahan tried,
among other things, to allege a claim of fraud against his former employer.75
The court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims because his petition was
"essentially one for wrongful discharge from employment under the umbrella of
the theories of tortious interference of business expectancies and fraud."'76 The
Hanrahan court further stated that "no matter what particular legal theory an
employee asserts against the employer for a claim of wrongful discharge,
whether it be for prima facie tort, implied contract . . . fraud, tortious
interference with business relations, outrageous conduct, or any other legal
theory which may seek to allege such a claim," it is barred by the employment
at-will doctrine.77 The court noted that regardless of the ingenuity of a plaintiff s
legal theory, the employment at-will doctrine prevents former employees from
suing their employers for terminating them.78
In the same year the court decided Hanrahan, the Eastern District again
dealt with the same issue, although under a slightly different guise. In Rosatone
v. GTE Sprint Communicaions,79 the plaintiff tried to avoid the bar of the
employment at-will doctrine by alleging detrimental reliance." The plaintiff,
after significant negotiations, was offered a job by GTE and Sprint to work in
their new joint venture.8 The defendants offered the plaintiff this job even
though they knew that he was already employed at the time by Citicorp.82 Less
than a month after the employment offer, Rosatone resigned from his job at
Citicorp to take the position with the defendants.' Six days after his resignation,
the defendants repudiated their employment contract with Rosatone and left him
completely unemployed." The court held that the employment at-will doctrine
barred the plaintiff from any recovery. The court stated that holding any other
way would introduce absurd and anomalous results. 6 Under the plaintiffs
theory, an employee who was discharged before he began work would be able
to collect compensation for his reliance, but an employee who worked for just
a single day before being discharged would be unable to collect.8 The court
concluded that the plaintiff's theory was just another "attempt to 'outflank' the
employment at will doctrine" and it would result in "no mutuality of obligation
75. Id. at 883.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 883-84 (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. 761 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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in that employers would be held liable for their promises while '[t]he employee
may quit any time or never start performance and suffer no liability.'
3 8
Like the Eastern District, the Western District has also rejected "fraud-like"
claims brought by plaintiffs attempting to skirt the employment at-will doctrine.
In Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing,9 the plaintiff alleged a claim for
intentional and negligent misrepresentation." The plaintiff assisted one of
Ryder's auditors with an investigation of its Lenexa, Kansas office only after the
auditor promised that the plaintiff would get his old job at Ryder back after the
investigation.9 However, at the end of the audit, the plaintiff was not hired
back.' The Western District, like the Eastern District in Rosatone, held that the
plaintiff could not "rely" on representations that he would be hired as an at-will
employee and could not use misrepresentation to "outflank the employment at-
will doctrine." 93
Missouri appellate courts have, however, recognized one narrow exception
to the employment at-will doctrine's absolute bar on wrongful termination
actions. In some limited circumstances, Missouri courts have allowed former
employees to maintain a tort action for wrongful termination.94 A tort action for
wrongful termination only lies if the employee was fired for a reason that clearly
violates public policy.95 As the Western District has explained, "[a]lthough
employers generally are free to discharge at-will employees with or without
cause at any time, they are not free to require employees, on pain of losing their
jobs, to commit unlawful acts or acts in violation of a clear mandate of public
policy."96 Public policy, as understood by Missouri courts, is limited to clear
expressions in the state constitution, statutes, or governmental regulations.97
Discharged employees can only maintain an action against their former
employers if they are fired for refusing to violate public policy or for reporting
their employer's violations to the government.98 Because such an action for
wrongful termination arises as a tort, it escapes the prohibitions of the
employment at-will doctrine.
Although Missouri state courts may not have previously addressed the exact
question presented in O'Neal, the Eighth Circuit has applied Missouri law to the
question whether a discharged at-will employee can sue her employer for fraud
88. Id. at 673 (quoting Morsinkhoffv. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344
S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)).
89. 954 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
90. Id. at 393.
91. Id. at 386.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 393.
94. See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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related to their employment agreement on at least two different occasions. The
Eighth Circuit first looked at the question in Bernoudy v. Dura-Bond Concrete
Restoration, Inc.99 As the Eighth Circuit understood Missouri law, "an at-will
employee may not bring a wrongful discharge action sounding in tort, unless the
duty breached is exclusively incidental to the contract.""le3 The plaintiffs alleged
that Dura-Bond made false statements to them promising that the plaintiffs
would have jobs with Dura-Bond after the plaintiffs sold their own company to
Dura-Bond's owners."0' The court held that the plaintiffs had made a
submissible case of fraud because the claim did not arise out of the employment
contract but arose "out of the negotiations prior to the employment
agreement.'
'i 1 2
In Paul v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 3 the Eighth Circuit once again looked
at fraud arising out of an employment relationship and this time reached the
opposite result.' The court held that Paul failed to prove a submissible case of
fraud under Missouri law.' The plaintiff claimed that he had been fraudulently
induced by Farmland into quitting his previous job based on statements made by
Farmland's president that his new employment with Farmland would be for a
term of three years."° The court found that Paul's claim was essentially a
cloaked contract claim, forbidden under Missouri law by Hanrahan 7 Unlike
the situation in Bernoudy, the claim arose from statements that were themselves
part of the contract and not merely incidental to it.'0 8
Missouri courts are not alone in having wrestled with questions of fraud and
the employment at-will doctrine. Other jurisdictions generally allow plaintiffs
to recover from their prospective employers using a fraud claim if they can show
both a misrepresentation separate from their employment contract and reliance
on that representation.'0 9 New York's employment at-will doctrine, which is
99. 828 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 1318 (quoting Deschler v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 797 F.2d
695, 697 (8th Cir. 1986)).
101. Id. at 1317.
102. Id. at 1318.
103. 37 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1994).
104. Id. at 1276.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the court's decision in Hanrahan, see
supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
108. Paul, 37 F.3d at 1276.
109. See generally Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that terminated lawyer could maintain an action for fraud based on her leaving her
previous firm because of employer's lies that she would head its environmental law
division and that it already had a large client for that division); Kidder v. AmSouth Bank,
N.A., 639 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. 1994) (holding that terminated bank vice-president could
maintain an action for fraud based on misrepresentations about what her working
1014 [Vol. 65
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss4/5
2 EMPLOYMENTA'- ILL10
substantially similar to Missouri's, has been applied by the Second Circuit to
allow a fired lawyer to maintain an action against her former firm. In Stewart
v. Jackson & Nash,"0 the attorney joined the defendant law firm after some of
its partners promised that she would become head of its environmental law
division and that the firm already had a client with a large volume of
environmental business."' After quitting her previous job as an environmental
lawyer and working for the firn for over a year on general litigation matters, the
plaintiff was terminated because the major environmental client and resultant
work never materialized." 2 The defendants tried to defeat the plaintiff's claim
based on an earlier New York state case which, like Dake, held that employees
at-will "can neither challenge their termination in a contract action nor
'bootstrap' themselves around this bar by alleging that the firing was in some
way tortious." 3 The Second Circuit found the case distinguishable because the
plaintiff's claim arose from events that occurred well before her termination and
were, in many ways, unconnected with her termination." 4 Because the
plaintiff's claim was not directly based on the employment contract and actually
conditions would be in her new position); Interstate Freeway Servs., Inc. v. Houser, 835
S.W.2d 872 (Ark. 1992) (allowing discharged at-will employee to maintain an action for
fraudulent inducement to enter into the employment relationship); United Parcel Serv.
Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1999) (allowing pilot to maintain action for fraud
based on company's promise at meeting attended by over fifty other pilots that they
would get jobs with UPS); Mueller v. Union Pac. R.R., 371 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1985)
(allowing former at-will employee to maintain action for fraud based on representations
from the company that he would not be terminated); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Sunas, 437
S.E.2d 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that employment at-will doctrine does not bar
a fraud claim that arises from misrepresentations used to induce plaintiff to enter into the
agreement); Albrant v. Sterling Furniture Co., 736 P.2d 201 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that the fact employee was offered an at-will position did not preclude employee from
bringing a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of her
employment); Dede v. Rushmore Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 470 N.W.2d 256 (S.D. 1991)
(allowing plaintiff to maintain cause of action for fraud where employer promised to
rehire employee if employee agreed to mandatory retirement at age sixty-two and moved
to Las Vegas, Nevada); Trimble v. Wash. State Univ., 993 P.2d 259 (Wash. 2000)
(holding, on other grounds, that statements to professor did not rise to the level of fraud,
but acknowledging that at-will employees are not precluded by the employment at-will
doctrine from maintaining a cause of action for fraud). But cf Schoff v. Combined Ins.
Co. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa 1999) (holding that an action for negligent
misrepresentation cannot arise from negotiations about an employment contract because
of the inherently adversarial nature of the employment relationship).
110. 976 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1992).
111. Id. at 87.
112. Id. at 87-88.
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arose before the contract was formed, the employment at-will doctrine had no
application to the plaintiffs situation."5
The Arkansas Supreme Court has also allowed a former employee to
maintain an action for fraud against his employer when he was fired after just
two weeks on the job. In Interstate Freeway Services, Inc. v. Houser,' 6 the
plaintiff, who was the former manager of a diner, was able to prove at trial that
the diner's owners had never intended for him to operate the restaurant; all they
really wanted the plaintiff to do was clean and prepare the restaurant for
opening." 7 Even though the plaintiff's claim in this case arose solely from the
employment contract itself, the court allowed the plaintiff to avoid the
employment at-will doctrine and collect under fraud." 8
In Interstate Freeway Services, one member of the court, Justice Dudley,
dissented from the majority opinion and attacked it "as standing for the
proposition that now, when an employer hires an employee at-will, but intends
to later replace him with someone else, the employer can be liable for the tort of
deceit.''. The decision, according to Justice Dudley, eviscerates the long held
employment at-will doctrine and goes against the core of the doctrine's
rationale. 2° The heart of the employment at-will doctrine, according to Justice
Dudley, is that the employment relationship's obligations must be mutual for a
specified term.'' The relationship obligations are mutual because:
If the employee does not agree to work a specified length of time, the
employer is not obligated to employ him for any specified length of
time. If the employer does not agree to employ the employee for a
specified length of time, the employee is free to leave at any time.'
The dissent argued that the court's holding destroys this logic by making the
employee free to leave at any time but requires the employer to continue the
relationship." Justice Dudley also pointed out that the tort of deceit also
requires mutuality. 24 Thus, "[u]nder the precedent of the majority opinion, if an
employee takes a job and inquires about vacations, insurance, and future
business expectations, but has a hidden intent to take a better job when it comes
along, as most employees do, he too will be subject to suit for the tort of
115. Id.
116. 835 S.W.2d 872 (Ark. 1992).
117. Id. at 874.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 876 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 876-77.
121. Id. at 877.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 879.
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deceit." t  Employees would therefore face the possibility of being held liable
for money damages to their former employers anytime they decide to find a new
job. 26
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In O'Neal, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of
Missouri held that an employee can maintain an action for fraud against his
former employer so long as the events that he relies upon for the claim are
separate from any breach of contract claim that he would have but for the
employment at-will doctrine.127 The court based its decision that O'Neal's claim
was not barred by the employment at-will doctrine on three cases: Bernoudy,
Paul, and Hanrahan.Iu First, the court recognized from Bernoudy that "a fraud
claim is permitted only if it arises from acts that are separate and distinct from
the contract."' 29 According to the court, there is a close analogy between the
facts of the Bernoudy case and the situation in O'Neal.'3 In Bernoudy, the court
noted, the fraud claim arose from statements made during the negotiations
regarding the nature of the plaintiff s employment.' 3 ' Here, the court noted,
O'Neal's fraud claims grew out of O'Neal's negotiations prior to employment.'32
Next, the court turned to Hanrahan and Paul to quickly dismiss the
assertion that either case governed the situation in O'Neal.'33 The court
concluded that Hanrahan was distinguishable from O 'Neal because it dealt with
a claim for wrongful discharge and O'Neal dealt with a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation in employment negotiations. 134 The court then distinguished
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Paul because the plaintiff in Paul also failed to
present a submissible case of fraud on its own elements. 31
After failing to find that the employment at-will doctrine blocked O'Neal's
claim, the court then looked to see if he sufficiently pled a submissible case of
fraud.' 36 The court noted that the elements of fraud include:
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 996 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
128. Id. at 702. For a discussion of these three cases, see supra notes 74-78, 99-
108 and accompanying text.





134. Id. at 702-03.
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(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of the truth; (5) the speaker's
intent that the representation be acted upon by the hearer and in the
manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its
falsity of the representation; (7) the hearer's reliance on the truth of the
representation; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the
hearer's consequent and proximately caused injury.'37
The plaintiff met this burden, in part, by alleging that one of Stifel's employees
had promised him that he would become an employee of the company and that
he relied on this promise to his detriment by hiring an assistant and beginning the
process of transferring clients to his new employer, Stifel.'38 The court thus
concluded that O'Neal had met his burden and remanded the case for a full trial
on the merits.'39
V. COMMENT
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri should
have sustained the trial court's ruling. O'Neal's claim, which arose out of an
employment contract with an indefinite duration, should have been barred by the
employment at-will doctrine. The court's opinion can be questioned on at least
two points. First, the decision is outside the limits previously set by Missouri
courts. Second, the decision is questionable when compared to the decisions of
other jurisdictions.
Bernoudy, the main case the court cites in support of its holding, presents
a factually different situation from the one presented in O'Neal. In Bernoudy,
the plaintiffs had a full-scale employment contract with numerous terms. 4° The
plaintiffs in Bernoudy alleged that prior to the time that they accepted Dura-
Bond's offer and formed an employment contract with Dura-Bond, they had
been lied to by the company's representatives so as to induce them to enter into
the contract.'4 ' In O'Neal, the plaintiff and Stifel's employee were in the process
of creating the terms of a contract at the time one of Stifel's employees told him
the company was definitely going to employ him.'42 In fact, the alleged
misrepresentations were the very same statements O'Neal used as the basis for
his breach of contract claim, which was barred by the employment at-will
137. Id. (citing City of Wellston v. Jackson, 965 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998)).
138. Id. at 701, 703.
139. Id. at 704.
140. See Bemoudy v. Dura-Bond Concrete Restoration, Inc., 828 F.2d 1316, 1317
(8th Cir. 1987).
141. Id.
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doctrine.' This difference is far from trivial. As the O'Neal court admits, the
key to the Bernoudy decision is that a fraud claim is only permitted when it
arises from acts that are "separate and distinct from the contract."" In O'Neal,
the allegedly fraudulent acts were not separate and distinct from the contract.
Rather, the acts were the contract. 4 ' In other words, the one case the court
claims supports its holding actually requires the court to dismiss O'Neal's fraud
claim.
Even if the court's reading of Bernoudy is correct, its argument lacks
binding force. Bernoudy is an Eighth Circuit case applying Missouri law. As
such, its authority in Missouri state courts is merely persuasive, and it technically
cannot require Missouri's state courts to reach any particular decision. If
Missouri law is contrary to it, state law precedents should control. In O'Neal,
the court quickly dismisses its own precedent in favor of a federal case." The
court chooses to ignore Hanrahan even though its facts are very similar to the
situation in O'Neal.47
In Hanrahan, the Eastern District recognized that Missouri is committed to
the continuing validity of the employment at-will doctrine. 4 ' The doctrine
requires that any tort claim, including fraud, that rests on the same grounds as a
precluded wrongful discharge claim must likewise be barred.'49 Because
O'Neal's claim arises from the exact same facts as his breach of contract claim,
it falls under Hanrahan's prohibition.'50 The O'Neal court's reasoning that
Hanrahan is distinguishable is questionable.' Count III of the plaintiffs
petition in Hanrahan, like count II in O'Neal's petition, asserts a claim for
fraud.5 2 Both cases similarly allege fraud claims that arise from the same events
as their causes of action, and therefore should be barred by the employment at-
will doctrine.
O'Neal's holding is in conflict with the majority of Missouri's employment
at-will case law. As stated earlier, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in
Dake can be seen as standing for the proposition that there is no cause of action
for wrongful discharge or breach of contract in the employment at-will context,
even if the suit is "cloaked" in tort law claims. 53 In subsequent cases like Faust
143. Id.
144. Id. at 702.
145. Id. at 701.
146. Id. at 703.
147. Id.; see Hanrahan v. Nashua Corp., 752 S.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988).
148. See Hanrahan, 752 S.W.2d at 883-84.
149. Id.
150. See O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 996 S.W.2d 700, 701-02 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999).
151. Id. at 702-03.
152. See Hanrahan, 752 S.W.2d at 882.
153. See Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Mo. 1985); see also Faust v. Ryder
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and Rosatone, the Missouri courts of appeals have uniformly applied the
employment at-will doctrine to prevent plaintiffs from making claims of fraud
or reliance based on the same facts as a prohibited breach of contract or wrongful
discharge claim.'54 Therefore, the Eastern District's decision in O'Neal is
probably in conflict with the Western District's decision in Faust, creating a
difficult situation for employment lawyers arguing before any division of the
court of appeals. 55 Even if these cases do not expressly conflict with the holding
in O'Neal, they should be examined and persuasively distinguished before the
court's holding in O'Neal can be relied on.
O'Neal's holding seems inconsistent with jurisdictions outside of Missouri
as well. The Second Circuit's opinion in Stewart is predicated, like Bernoudy,
on the fact that the fraud claim must arise from events that are completely
separate from the employment contract. 5 6 In O'Neal, the underlying events are
the same for both the breach of contract claim and the fraud claim.'57 The
Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion does provide some support for the O'Neal
holding.' s8 Yet, the Arkansas court's opinion in Interstate Freeway Services was
heavily criticized by Justice Dudley in dissent. As Justice Dudley pointed out,
the majority failed to analyze the facts of the case using the employment at-will
doctrine and failed to give more than a passing glance to the potential impact this
decision could have on the employment at-will doctrine.""
The Arkansas Supreme Court also failed to deal with the problem that its
decision creates in opening up employees to fraud claims brought by their
employers for taking a better job. 60 Although there has been no reported case
of an employer suing a former employee for fraud when she takes another job,
it is theoretically possible.16' Such a result could have a chilling effect on the
Commercial Leasing, 954 S.W.2d 383, 393-94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
154. See Faust, 954 S.W.2d at 393-94; Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications,
761 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
155. See Faust, 954 S.W.2d at 393-94.
156. See Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1992).
157. See O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 996 S.W.2d 700, 701-02 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999).
158. See Interstate Freeway Servs., Inc. v. Houser, 835 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ark.
1992).
159. Id. at 877.
160. Id. at 879.
161. A former employer could meet the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation
in many situations. For example, a medium size law firm hires a young associate fresh
out of law school to work in its practice. The firm places a premium on long-term
relationships and intends that every associate it hires will eventually become a partner
in the firm. The partners make a point of asking every prospective associate they
interview if she intends to stay in the area for the rest of her career and eventually
become a partner in the firm, contributing to its vitality. Only candidates who
affirmatively state that this is their intention are hired. The partners spend time with the
associate, telling her how to improve her work and developing her skills as an attorney.
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American labor market. In robust economic times, tight labor markets already
cause employers to take drastic steps to hire new employees or retain current
workers.'62 As recent non-compete clause litigation shows, employers are not
adverse to using.the legal system to prevent employees, even in low-paying
positions, from working for a competitor. An employer conceivably could sue
a former employee for fraud in an attempt to "make an example of her" to other
employees, or to prevent the employee from working in or starting a competing
business. Because of the great disparity in resources between most workers and
their employers, the threat or possibility of a suit could present a major obstacle
to employees who want to leave their present employers.
The partners also give her significant client responsibility and introduce her to the firm's
most important clients. After five years, the associate leaves the firm and opens her own
office right down the street, taking some of the firm's best clients with her. In a
newspaper article about the opening of her new practice the former associate states that
it has always been her dream to have her own firm and that she went to work with her old
firm solely to "learn the ropes," save enough money, and develop a client base to strike
out on her own. Under the logic of O Neal and the Arkansas Supreme Court in Interstate
Freeway Services, the law firm would have a cause of action against the attorney for
fraudulent misrepresentation.
162. See Workers See The Biggest Jump in Wages and Benefits in 10 Years, ST.
LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 2000, at C8. A shortage of workers has already caused
companies in some industries to take drastic steps. For example, in the Oklahoma oil
fields, experienced workers are so hard to find that one company sends a representative
to the state prison every time a group of parolees is released to try to recruit employees.
See Renee Ruble, The Oil Industry's Conundrum: There's Nobody to Do the Work, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 30, 2000, at C6.
163. See Renal Treatment Ctrs.-Missouri, Inc". v. Braxton, M.D., 945 S.W.2d 557,
564-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (employer tried to enforce non-compete covenant against
doctor even though employer had no protectable interest in doctor's contacts with
patients); West Group Broad., Ltd. v. Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934, 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
(Crow, J., dissenting) (employer tried to enforce restrictive covenant against radio station
employee paid six dollars an hour); Shelbina Veterinary Clinic v. Holthaus, 892 S.W.2d
803, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (employer attempted to enforce non-compete agreement
prohibiting veterinarian from practicing within thirty-five miles of city for four years
when consideration for the agreement was only five hundred dollars).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The O'Neal decision creates a new way for discharged employees to dance
around the employment at-will doctrine and receive compensation for their
injuries. Yet, this opportunity may be short lived because the court's decision
may be in conflict with other Missouri district appellate courts and previous
Missouri case law. The court in O'Neal adds another layer to the complexities
of employment law and, in so doing, possibly goes against the very foundations
of Missouri's understanding of employment at-will.
JAMES E. MEADows
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